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FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON TITLE I
PROGRAMS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
establishment clause2 problems raised by government3 efforts to fund
programs benefiting students of private schools. 4 As the political mood
of the country has swung toward conservatism in recent years, these
problems, which cut to the heart of sensitive church-state relations,
have come into sharper focus. In evaluating the constitutionality of
government programs designed to aid private schools, the Court has
charted an uncertain path, upholding some programs5 while striking
I. The Court first cons1dered the constitutionality of pubhc aid to parochial school
students m Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. I (1946). Everson is often heralded as
the first modem establtshment clause case.
2. U.S CONST. amend. I. reads, m pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of relig1on, or proh1b1ting the free exerci~ thereof...."
3. Generally, state and local governments have provided the funding for programs
aidmg parochial schools. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Reagan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (state funds for te.~tmg and recordkeeping); Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Relig1ous Liberty v. NyquiSt, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York statute
providmg tuition grants, tax benefits and funds for maintenance and repatr). Aguilar v
Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985), is the first case challengingfederal aid to elementary and
secondary parochial ~hoots to come before the Supreme Court. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 US. 402, 405 (1974).
4. In the 1980-81 school year, private schools enrolled about 5.3 million schoolchildren. Cooper, McLaughlin, & Manno, Latest Word on Private-School Growth, 85
TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 88, 96 (1983). Experts predict that by 1990, 5% of all
American schoolchildren will attend private schools. ld. at 95. Catholic schools make
up the largest bloc of private schools. See generally id. Cathohc school enrollment,
however, is declinmg, perhaps because of financial difficulties: "Between 1965 and
1983, the number of Cathohc elementary and secondary schools dropped from a total of
13,292 with enrollments of 5.6 million pupil!. to 9432 schools w1th slightly over 3 million children." Jd. at 91.
5. See, e.g., Comm1ttee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (state mandated testing and recordkeeping); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (books, testing, diagnostic and therapeutic services, off-sne remed1al services);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S
672 (1971) (construction grants and loans to church related colleges and umvers1t1es
under the federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
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down others.6 With no coherent method of legal analysis, the Court
has relied on factual distinctions to differentiate permissible from impermissible parochial school aid programs.7
In Meek v. Pittenger,8 the Court held inter alia that a program employing public school teachers to conduct educational activities on private school premises violated the establishment clause. 9 In the
aftermath of Meek, local implementations of the federal Title I 10 program came under constitutional attack. 11 In its recent decision in
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947)
(reimbursement for bus transportation).
6. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (instructional materials, equipment, field trips); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (auxiliary services); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenance
and repair. tuiuon grant!>, tax benefits); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Ltberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (mtemally prepared state-mandated testing); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 612 (1971) (teacher salanes, textbooks, mstructional materials).
7. See 1n/ra notes 151-56 and accompanymg text.
8. 421
349 (1975).
9. ld at 373. The educauonaJ acuvtlles performed by public school teachers included remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, and
speech and bearing servtc~ . !d. at 367.
10. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat.
27 (codified at various sections of 20 U .S. C.). Because Congress incorporated ESEA
mto the Educauon Consolidation and Impro~ement Act of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-35,
§ 551, 95 Stat. 463 (codified in various secttons of 20 U.S.C.), which c. now part of
SubtitleD of Tttle V of the Omnibus Budget ReconctliatJon Act of 1981, Title Its now a
misnomer. See Wilson, ESEA Title I Litigation-Update, 28 CATH. LAW 159, 159
(1982). Nevertheless, the courts continue to use Title I as a shorthand reference to the
statute, and this Recent Development will follow that practice
II. In 1976, the Nauonal Coahtton for Public Education and Religious Liberty
(PEARL) filed the first case dtreclly chaJlengmg the constituhonahty of Title I in the
federal Distnct Court for the Southern District of New York See Nauonal Coaliuon
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F . Supp. 1248 (S.D.N Y 1976),
appeal dismissed sub nom. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religtous Liberty v.
Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808, rehg denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980). Because of a procedural
error, the Supreme Court never heard the case Su Wilson, supra note 10, at 159.
Plamulfs also filed actions in California, Kentucky, Minnesota and M1ssoun, as well as
a second SUit in New York. The second New York cao;c, Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct.
3232 ( 1985), reached the Supreme Court.
An earlier case had presented the Supreme Court wuh the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of Tille I, but the Court dechned to do so. In Wheeler v. Barrera. 417
U.S. 402 (1974), the Court held only that nonpubhc school students are entitled to
comparable, if not identical, services under Title I to those provtded pubhc school stu·
dents. ld at 425. The Court decided the case as a matter of statutory con~truction.
The Court stated, "At this time, we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause
effect of any particular program." !d. at 426 But several justices in separate opinions
did take the opportunity to express their v1ew on the constitutionality of Title I pro-
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Aguilar v. Felton, 12 a divided Court followed Meek to invalidate New
York City's implementation of Title I in private schools. 13
II.

HISTORY OF AGUILAR

Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 14 in response to the problem of educational deprivation in low income areas. 1 ~ Title I provides federal funds for special
educational programs to supplement existing state and local programs16 for children 17 who are both educationally deprived 18 and live
in low-income areas. 19 The regulations promulgated under Title I regrams in which public school teachers instruct on pnvate school premises. Justice Powell said that he " ... would have senous misgi\ings about the constitutionality of a
statute that required the ut11izauon of public school teachers in sectarian schools." /d.
at 428 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Wh1te was "pleasantly surprised by what appears to be a suggest1on that federal funds may in some respects be used to finance
nonsectarian instruction of students in private elementary and secondary schools." /d.
at 429 (White, J. , concurring). Justice Douglas commented that "the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it supports sectarian schools, whether directly or through its students." /d. at 432 (D ouglas, J., dic;sentmg).
12. 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
13. /d. at 3238-39.
14. Pub. L. No. 89- 10, 95 Stat 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
15. Congress mtended that the Act would broaden opportumties for pnvate school
students to partic1pate in remedial programs. S. RuP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. II
(1965). The Senate report lists several possible Title I programs including supplementary mstructional materials, curriculum materials centers, remed1al programs, enrichment programs, instructional media centers, mobile learning centers and supplemental
health and food serv1ces. /d. at 10-11.
16. The federally funded programs must supplement, not supplant, state programs.
See 34 C.F.R. § 200.62 (1985). See generally Holl, The Title I Supplanting Prohibition,
9 NOLPE ScH. L.J. 23 ( 1980).
17. The Act refers to aid to children, rather than aid to schools. Thus, Title I is
arguably analogous to the leg1slation at issue m Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I
(1947), in which the Court upheld bus fare reimbursement as permissible atd to children
rather than unconstitutional ass1stance to parochtal schools. /d. at 5. See infra note 3738 and accompanying text ; Anastaplo, The Religwn Clauses of the First Amendment, II
MEM. ST. U. L. REv 151 , 157 ( 1981).
18. The Implementing regulations define "educationally deprived children" as "children whose educational attainment is below the level that is appropriate for ch1ldren of
the1r age." 34 C.F.R. § 200.3(b)(2) (1985).
19. The Congressional statutory declaration of policy !otates
In recogmtion of the special educational needs of children of low-income families
and the impact that concentra tions of low-income families have on the ability of
local educational agencies to ~upport adequate educational programs, the Congress
hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assist-
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quire that services provided to nonpublic school students be comparable to those provided public school students.2° The language of the
statute does not explicitly authorize sending public school teachers into
private schools to conduct educational activities. 21 Nevertheless, the
Senate report suggested that on-premises instruction might be an option for local educational agencies. 22
ance . . to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children
from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by
various means ... which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational
needs of educationally deprived children.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-10 1 § 2, 79 Stat. 27,
27 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 2701 (1982)). Congress struc tured the Act so that local educational administration would remain in the hands of local educational agencies (LEAs);
Congress did not want to federalize traditional local control over education. LEAs propose Title I programs for local implementation; state educational agencies (SEAs) must
approve the plans. Congress then channels the funds through the SEAs for implementation of the plans by the LEAs.
20. 34 C.F.R . § 200.71 (1985). The regulations do not require that private school
programs be identical to those in public schools; rather, they demand that LEAs distribute services to private school students on an equitable basis:
... In consultation with pnvate school officials, an LEA shall provide educationally deprived children residing in a project area of the LEA who are enrolled in
private elementary and secondary schools with special educational services and arrangements as will assure participation on an equitable basis of those children ...
. . If the LEA decides to serve educationally deprived, low-income children
under Section 556(b)(l)(C) of Chapter I, the LEA shall also provide Chapter 1
services to educationally deprived, low-income children in private schools as will
assure participation on an equitable basis of those children .. .
(b) Services on an equitable basis. The Chapter I services that an LEA provides for educationally deprived children in private schools must be equitable (in
relation to the services provided to public school children) and must be of sufficient
1ze, scope. and quality to g1ve reasonable promise of substantial progress toward
meeting the special educational needs of the pnvate school children to be served.
34 C.F . R. §§ 200.70(a), 200.7I(b) (1985). See also Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402,
422 n.17 ( 1974).
The program, however, has not been administered equitably. One 1977 report estimated that Title I aid reached only about 47% of eligible nonpublic school students,
and that those students received only about I 8% of the services to wh1ch they were
entitled. Vitullo-Martin, Interim Report, Summary Report: Delivery of Title I Services
to Non-Public School Students, repr~nted in Hearings on H.R. 15 Before the Subcomm.

on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 555, 565 (1977).
21. See Felton v. Secretary, Dep't. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), affd sub
nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985): "If we were to look only at the language
of the statute, we would not be altogether sure that a program sending pubhc school
teachers mto religio us schools was authorized." 739 F.2d at 50 n.2.
22. The Senate Report noted the appropnate restrictions on such instruction:
"[P]ublic school teachers will be made available to o ther than pubhc school facilities
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In 1976, taxpayers began to mount constitutional challenges to Title
I programs as administered in parochial schools. 23 The New York City
program was the target of litigation that reached the Supreme Court in
Aguilar. 24 The district court held that New York City's use of Title I
funds for remedial instruction by public school teachers on the premises of parochial schools was consistent with the establishment clause.25
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the presence of public school
teachers in private parochial schools created a risk that the public personnel would act to foster religion.26 In Aguilar a sharply divided
Supreme Court affirmed that holding. 27 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, relied on entanglement principles28 articulated in Meek
and Lemon v. Kurtzman 29 to invalidate the New York City program. 30
Justices Burger, Rehnquist, 31 O'Connor and White32 filed separate dissents; O'Connor accused the majority of mishandling first amendment
doctrine to strike down a legitimate government program that had
only to provide specialized services ... (such as therapeutic, remedial or welfare services) and only where such services are not normally provided by the nonpublic school."
S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
23. See supra note II.
24. Failure to file a timely appeal foreclosed earlier opportunity for Supreme Court
review of a Title 1 holding. See National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religion v.
Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal dismissed sub. nom National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Rehgion v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808, reh 'g denied, 449 U.S.
1028 (1980). Thus, tl was a full nme years after the first challenge to Title I, see supra
note II, before the Supreme Court issued an opinion on Title l's constitutionality. See
infra notes 105-144 and accompanying text.
25. The district court dispo~ of the case upon defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3236.
26. Felton v. Secretary, Dep't. ofEduc., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), a./J'd sub nom.
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985). See mfra note 75 (explaining Supreme Court's
concern that publicly employed teachers mtght Improperly foster religion).
27. 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
28. For a discussion of entanglement principles see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying te1et.
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971}; see infra notes 47-59 and accompanying te1et.
30. /d. at 3237-38.
31. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985) (invalidating school prayer
and meditation statute), Justice Rehnquist authored a comprehensive opinion C1tpressing his dtssent to the judgments in Wallace, Aguilar and Grand Rapids School Dtst. v.
Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) (invahdattng local programs that provided for Shared Time
and Community Education class~ 111 paroch1al schools).
32. Justice White wrote briefly to reaffirm his dissenting opinion in Lemon, lOS
S.Ct. at 3248.
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been in successful operation for twenty years. 33
Ill.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PUBLIC
TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

Am

The Court decided Everson v. Board of Education, 34 the first case
challenging government aid to parochial schools, in 1946. Everson upheld a program that reimbursed parents of all schoolchildren, public
and private, for costs incurred in busing their children to school. 35 Justice Black's majority opinion36 focused on the fact that the program
benefitted children, 37 rather than schools. 38 Justice Black emphasized
that the Court would not be so tolerant of aid programs that reached
farther than the one involved there:39 the reimbursement program approached the "verge" of constitutional permissibility. 40
Following Everson, there was a twenty year lull in Supreme Court
consideration of parochial school aid statutes. In 1968, the Court upheld a textbook loan program against an establishment clause challenge in Allen v. Board of Education. 41 Again, the Court emphasized
that the benefits the program funded were available to all students in
33. Justice O'Conner stated that "over almost two decades, New York's publiC
schoolteachers have helped thousands of impoverished parochial schoolchildren to
overcome educational disadvantages without once attempling to inculcate religious values. Their praiseworthy efforts have not eroded and do nol threaten the relig1ous hbert)
assured by the Estabhshment Clause." 105 S.Ct. at 3248 (O'Connor, J., dis!>Cntmg).
34. 330 U.S. I (1946).
35. Jd. at 5.
36. Justices Jackson and Rutledge filed dic;...cnting opinions.
37. Justice Black explamed that "the State contnbutes no money to the schools. It
does not support them. Its leg1slation, as apphed, does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get the1r ch1ldren, regardless of the1r rehg1on, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." 330 U.S. at 18 Compare the argument that
Title I is a general program benefittmg all children, o n the order of Everson. Anastaplo.
supra note 17, at 157.
38 Cf Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1682
( 1969) ("The sharp dichotomy between pupil benefit and benefit to the school seem~ to
me a ch1merical constitutional cnterion.").
39. Cf Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict I nterpretation
of the Establishment Clause, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1467 (198 1) ("Biact..'s unfonunate reading of the facts m Everson undercut the general welfare except1on: thus CVI\Cer·
ated, the theory could prov1de no pnnc1pled way of d1stinguishmg free bus ride!> from
state aid in the form of tuition grants o r payment of other educational expen~."),
40. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
41. 392 u.s. 236 (1968).
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specified grades, regardless of type of school attended.42 The Court
noted that policy considerations played a significant role in its analysis;43 it emphasized the important place of private schools in our national educational system.44 Justice Black45 dissented in Allen,
expressing concern that books could tend to propagate the religious
views of the schools.46
In 1971 , the court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, 41 holding unconstitutional two state plans designed to supplement salaries of parochial
school teachers. 48 Lemon, though today considered a landmark establishment clause case, was only a plurality decision.49 The plurality assembled three tests used in prior establishment clause cases and applied
them to the parochial school aid program. Now collectively known as
the Lemon test, the three prongs are: first, the enactment in question
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, its implementation must
not involve an excessive entanglement of government with religion. $0
The third prong, entanglement, has both administrative and political
42. Jd at 241
43. /d. at 247.
44. /d. at 247. Compare Justice Powell's comments in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 262 (1977), argumg against a total cutoff of aid to paroclual schools:
The perst~tent d~ire of a number of stat~ to find proper means of helpmg sectarian education to survtve would be doomed. This Court has not yet thought that
such a harsh result is required by the Establishment Clause. Certainly few would
consider It sn the public interest. Parochial schools ... have provided an educational altemauve for millions of young Americans and in some states they relieve
substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public -;chools.
/d.
45. Note that Justice Black wrote the maJonty optmon m Everson.
46. Allen, 392 U.S. at 252 (Black, J., dissenung). See Freund, supra note 38, at
1683, recallmg Justice Black'~> '\erge" language m Everson-" a bridge that carries you
to the verge i~ apt to be burned behind when }OU dtscover that the verge is farther ahead
after all."
47. 403 u.s. 602 (197 1).
48. The Pennsylvania statute at issue provided for reimbun.ement to schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks and institutional matenals, the challenged Rhode Island
statute pro vided that the state wo uld pay a 15% salary ~upplement dtrectly to nonpub·
lie school teachers. 403 U.S. at 607-10.
49. Chief Justice Burger delivered the judgment of the Court tn an optmon tn which
Justices Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun joined. Justices White, Douglas and Brennan
submitted separate opmions
50. The Court adapted the first two prongs from a school prayer ca~e. School Di~t.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The third pro ng origtnated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), which involved property tax exemptions for religious inl>titutions.
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aspects. 51 Administrative entanglement reflects concern that day-today government involvement with religious affairs injures nonadherents by appearing to endorse a particular religion. 52 Political entanglement rests on a notion that when government supports one or more
religions, religious views are apt to control the political choices of voters and legislators. 53 Applying the test, Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion found impermissible entanglement in Lemon.54 He distinguished the plan at issue from the earlier textbook case, Allen, by reasoning that a teacher "under religious control and discipline"55 poses a
danger to separation of secular from sectarian that a book, whose contents are readily ascertainable, does not. 56
In his separate Lemon opinion, Justice White articulated the views
on which he relied in subsequent cases, including Aguilar. 57 Justice
White lamented the quandary the Lemon test creates for parochial
schools: an aid program must provide sufficient monitoring to ensure
that religion is not advanced, yet that very governmental monitoring
gives rise to entanglement. 58 Justice White favored an approach that
would uphold an aid program so long as the financing serves a "separable secular function of overriding importance. " 59
The Court decided a trio of parochial school aid cases in 1973, strikS I. See generally MacNab, The Forbidden Fruit of Church-State Contoct.t· the Rolt
of Entanglement Theory, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV 725 (1982). Generally, the presence of
political entanglement alone is not enough to render a program unconstitutional. /d. at
741.
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620; see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. Cf Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: Hu·
toncol Overview and Future Prognos1s, 24 ST LOUIS U. L. J. 183 ( 1980) (arguing that
the Supreme Court Justtces are mfluenced by their rehgions when dectdmg establishment clause cases).
54. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinton examined three aspect of the churchstate relauonshtp to determine whether imperm1ss1ble entanglement extSted. Fir.;t, it
examined the character and purposes of benefited institutions; ~econd, it examined the
nature of the aid provided by the state; and thtrd, it exammed the resulting rclation~hip
between government and the reltgtous authonty. Lemon, 403 U.S at 615.
SS. /d. at 612.
56. /d. at 617.
57 Aguilar, lOS S.Ct. at 3248 See also Grand Rap1ds School D1st. v. Ball, lOS
S.Ct. 3216, 3248 (1985).
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668.
59. /d. at 664. Justice White explained that parochtal M:hools have a "dual role,"
performmg both secular and religious function~: "leg1~lation havmg a secular pu~
and extendmg governmental assistance 10 sectarian ~chools in the performance of their
secular functions does not constitute law[s] respecting an ~tabh~hment of religio n for-
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ing down the challenged programs in each. Sloan v. Lemon 60 invalidated a program providing tuition grants; Levitt v. Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty61 struck down a program reimbursing private schools for the costs incurred in complying with state
testing and record keeping requirements. The third case, Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 62 invalidated a
comprehensive New York aid statute that provided funds for building
maintenance and tuition grants, and authorized tax deductions for parents of children attending private schools. The Nyquist majority63 emphasized that the flaw in the statute stemmed from its direct provision
of funds to aid parochial schools, without corresponding safeguards
that the use of those funds would be limited to secular functions. 64
Thus, the program violated the primary effect prong of the Lemon
test.65
In contrast, during the 1973 term, the Court did approve a legislative scheme providing state revenue bonds to finance building projects
at a sectarian college in Hunt v. McNair. 66 Over Justice Brennan's dissent,67 the Court distinguished Hunl from earlier cases by arguing that
higher-level institutions are less likely to inculcate religious values than
their elementary and secondary counterparts. 68
The Court next examined the private school aid issue in Meek v.
Pittenger,69 decided in 1975. Meek presented a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute closely resembling Title I in its provision for "auxiliary
bidden by the First Amendment merely because a secular program may incidentally
benefit a church m fulfilling its religious mission." /d. at 663-64.
60. 413 u.s. 825 (1973).
61. 413 u.s. 472 (1973).
62. 413 u.s. 756 (1973).
63. Justice Powell authored the majority op1nion, in which Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and B1ackmun jomed
64. /d. at 780. Justice Wh1te, in dissent, argued that the statute was constitutional
because the state should reimbur;c parents of private schoolchildren to the extent it is
relieved of the burden of educating them. Id . at 814 (White, J., dissenting).
65. Jd. at 780.
66. 413 u.s. 734, 746 ( 1973).
67. Brennan argued that the state policing of college actiVIties necessary under the
program to ensure non~taria n u~e of funds rendered the program unconstitutional.
Jd. at 752.
68. Id. at 745-46. See also Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736
(1 976).
69. 421 u.s. 349 (1975).
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services. " 70 Those services included publicly employed teachers conducting remedial programs71 on private school premises. 72 Citin&
Lemon, the Court held this portion of the statute unconstitutionaL'
The potential for improper fostering of religion is present, the Court
reasoned, any time teachers render services in a pervasively sectarian
atmosphere. 74 Therefore, the state would need to maintain continual
surveillance to ensure that its publicly-funded teachers do not, e~cn
inadvertently,75 advance religion. Accordingly, this provision fell
under the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 76
Other statutory provisions held unconstitutional in Meek included
direct loans of instructional materials77 and equipment to nonpubhc
schools. The Court stated that although the statute earmarked loans
for secular use only, it is impossible to separate the secular educational
functions of parochial schools from their predominantly religious mi sion. 78 Nevertheless, a different majority of the Court79 upheld a provision of the statute that authorized textbooks loans on the authority of
Allen.80
70.

/d. at 352-53.

71. The remedial programs mvolvcd both individual therapy and classroom instruction. /d. at 352.
72. "Act 194 specifies that the teaching and services are to be provided in the nonpublic schools themselves by pcrwnnel drawn from the appropriate intermediate urut.
part of the public school system. ..." /d. at 353.
73. /d. at 372.

74. /d. at 371-72.
75. The Court does not infer bad faith on the part of teachers. The Lemon Court
states that "[w]e need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools wJ!I be
guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations tmposed by the
statute and the First Amendment." 403 U.S. at 618. The Court's concern, however,
that the atmosphere in which the teacher instructs may inadvertantly influence htm
The policing necessary to ensure that teachers "play a strictly nonideological role" gl\O
rise to excessive entanglement between church and state. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370
76.

77.

Meek, 421 U .S. at 372.
The materials included maps, charts and laboratory equipment. /d. at 365.

78. /d. at 365. The Court held that the " direct loan" of these materials furthered
the sectarian mission of the schools. /d. at 363. Cf text accompanying infra note 93
(discussing the Regan majority's reading of Meek).
79. The Justices upholding the textbook provision included Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and White, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas, Brmnan and Marshall dissented.
80. /d. at 362. See Allen v. Board of Educ., 392 U.S. 236 (1968); supra not~ 41·46
and accompanying text.
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In a subsequent case, Wolman v. Walter, 81 the Court again dissected
a state aid program, upholding some of its provisions while declaring
others impermissible. The Court upheld provisions authorizing statefunded textbook loans, testing services not under the control of the
private school, and diagnostic services and therapeutic services to be
provided away from private school premises. 82 Especially interesting is
the court's analysis of the provision for therapeutic services. The program resembled both Title I and the program invalidated in Meek: all
three programs provided remedial and therapeutic services to nonpublic school students.R3 The Wolman program, however, specified that
the publicly-employed teachers and therapists were to render their
services in public schools, public centers or mobile units off the private
school premises.84 To the Court, this site consideration distinguished
the Wolman plan from the Meek program. 85 The Court said that the
danger it perceived to be present in Meek, that teachers might improperly advance religious ideas, was absent in Wolman because teachers
would be performing services away from the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of parochial schools. 86
The most recent pre-Aguilar decision handed down by the Supreme
Court in the area of public aid to parochial schools was Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 81 decided in 1980.
Regan, a 5-4 decision, 811 upheld a New York statute directing payment
to private schools for costs incurred in performing state mandated testing and recordkeeping services. 89 Regan was the first case to authorize

u.s. 229 (1977).

81.

433

82.

/d. at 255.

83. See supra notes 16-22 and 69-76 and accompanying text; 433 U.S. at 244-48.
84. 433 U.S. at 244 n 12.
85. !d. at 247.
86. !d. at 247: "So long as these types of services are offered at truly religiously
neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek does not arise."
87. 444 u.s. 646 (1980).
88. Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger comprised
the majority in Regan.
89. /d. at 648. The legislation involved in Regan required that private school personnel administer tests prepared by the state. !d. at 645. Cj Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Relig1ous L1berty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (Court invalidated earlier New
York statute that financed tests prepared by private school personnel). The recordkecping services for which the Regan Court upheld reimbursement involved compilation of
data regarding the student body, faculty, physical facilities, curriculum and pupil attendance. 444 U.S. at 656.
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direct payments of any kind to parochial schools. 90 The majority held
that the services for which the schools receive reimbursements have
neither a religious purpose nor religious effect,91 and that the auditing
procedures did not constitute impermissible entanglement.92 Perhaps
the most important contribution of Regan to the Title I issue is its
reading of Meek. The Regan majority said that Meek, read in light of
Wolman, did not stand for the broad proposition that "any aid to a
sectarian school is suspect since its religious teaching is so pervasively
intermixed with each and every one of its activities."93 The Regan
dissent,94 on the other hand, argued that Wolman reinforced the Meek
conclusion that "direct aid to the educational function of religious
schools necessarily advances the sectarian enterprise as a whole."95
The Regan maJOrity cautioned that its decision should not be considered a "litmus-paper"96 test for future problems. It acknowledged that
past decisions in the area avoided "categorical imperatives" and "absolutist approaches," sacrificing "clarity and predictability" for "ftexibility."97Thus, although Regan demonstrated that the Lemon test could
be met by some legislative plans that provide aid to parochial schools,
the sharp division on the Court, 98 together with the majority's reservations, evidences the uncertainty inherent in the test's application.99
90. Set Comment, Comnuttee for Public Education v. Regan; New Possibthttes for
State Aid to Nonpublic Schools, 24 ST. Louts U .L.J. 406, 406 (1980). See also Comment, Commlltee for Pubhc Education v. Regan, 26 N .Y.L. ScH. L RLV . 915, 940
( 198 1) (arguing that R egan lS a policy decision designed to "mainta10 the viability of
parochial schools").
91. 444 U.S. at 658-59. Because the New York Law provides "ample safeguards
aga10st excesstve or mtsdirected reimbursement," the Coun felt that the program's secular effect was ensured. Jd at 659.
92. /d. at 660. The New York ~tatute required pnvate schools to submtt to the New
York State Commissioner of Education an accounting of their reimbursable costs under
the program along wtth sub!.tantiating documents The ~tatute also required periodic
review of the accounts of panicipating o;chools to verify eltpenses. /d. at 660-61.
93. Jd at 661
94. Jusuce Blackmun filed a di sent 10 which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
Jusuce Stevens filed a ~parate dissenting opinion.
95. Jd. at 666 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
96. 444 U.S. at 662.
97. Jd.
98. Note that although Ju~tice Powell was in the R~ofl maJOnty, uphold10g aid to
parochtal schools, he also voted w1th the maJOnty m Aguilar and wrote an opinion
concurring 10 that judgment. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text
99. Outside the paroch1al school aid area. the Coun continued the Regan accomodatiomst trend In Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), the Coun upheld
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The modem establishment clause cases demonstrate that in spite of
the Court's articulation of a test in Lemon, 100 subsequent decisions
continued to tum on factual distinctions. In general, the Court has
permitted welfare services provided to all children regardless of the
type of school they attend. 101 On the other hand, the Court has viewed
more suspiciously services which touch on the educational function of
parochial schools. 102 The Court has used location of service provision
as a differentiating factor between permissible and impermissible aid
programs. 103 The Court also makes a distinction between aid directed
to colleges and aid directed to lower level schools. 104 The Court invokes these factual distinctions without persuasive empirical support.
Because of the Court's reliance on factual distinctions, the content of
the Lemon test remains in doubt. The Court's unprincipled application
of the Lemon test in the parochial school aid context renders predictability of results almost impossible to obtain.
IV.

AGUILAR V. FELTON

In 1985, the Supreme Court decided several cases involving sensitive
church-state issues. 10' Two of those cases concerned public aid to parochial schools. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 106 a divided
court struck down a locally-funded program in which pubHcly employed teachers conducted "Shared Time" and "Community Education" classes in classrooms leased from private schools. 107 Over the
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island's practice of exhibiting a creche in its annual
Chnstmas display. Jd. at 1359. The Court characterized the creche as a symbol of
general good will, rather than one Yoith religious significance. !d.
100. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. I, 5 (1946); see also Anastaplo,
supra note 17, at 157.
102. See, e.g., Meek v. Ptttenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 {1975); see also Anastaplo, supra
note 17, at 159.
103. Compare Wolman v Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (off-site remedial services
permisstble) with Meek v. Ptttenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (on-sue remedtal services
unconstitutional)
104. Compare Hunt v McNair, 413 U.S 734 (1973) (revenue bonds for sectarian
colleges upheld) with Commtttee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Ltbcrty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (aid package for lower level schools unconstituttonal).
105. See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist v.
Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985); Wallace v. Jatrree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
106. lOS S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
107. /d. at 3231. "Shared Time" classes supplemented the core cumculum in private schools by provadmg "remedial" and "enrichment" services /d. at 32 I 8. "Com-
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partial dissents of Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, 1011 and
the dissents of Justices Rehnquist 109 and White, the majority 110 concluded that the Grand Rapids program violated the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test. 111 Because the Grand Rapids School District
failed to provide a system of monitoring to ensure that religion was not
advanced in the program classes, 112 entanglement was not an issue.
The Title I program at issue in Aguilar, in contrast, operated
through New York City's Bureau of Non public School Reimbursement
which supervised all activities conducted in non public schools. 11 3 The
city argued that this system of monitoring, bolstered by a twenty year
record of operation without incident, precluded a holding that the Title
I program had the effect of advancing religion. 114 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, chose not to address that argument. 11 s Instead, the majority relied on the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test and the precedent set by Meek . 116
The majority identified the two concerns of the Lemon entanglement
munity Education" classes were offered after the close of the normal school day and
were strictly voluntary, nonacademic classes. /d. at 3219.
108. Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor agreed with the ma)Onty that the
"Community Education" classes were unconstitutional, but d1ssented from the judgment masmuch as 1t struclc down the "Shared Time" classes.
109. Justice RehnqUJst wrote a comprehensive dissenting opinion m Wallace, 105
S.Ct. at 2508, on which he rehed in Aguilar and Grand Rapids. See infra not~ 132-38
and accompanying text.
110. Justice Brennan authored the majority opinions in both Grand Rap1ds and
Aguilar.
Ill. lOS S.Ct. at 3223-24.
112. !d. at 3224-25.
113. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3235. Field personnel of the Bureau of Nonpublic School
Reimbursement made occasional unannounced visits to panic1pating nonpublic schooh
Title I instructors were directed to carefully avOid any mvolvement with the school ·
religious activities. All religious symbols were removed from Title I classrooms. ld
I 14. /d. at 3236.
I I 5. The majority explained:
Appellants' argument fails many event, because the upervisory system established
by the City of New York ineVItably results m the excesstve entanglement of church
and state, an Establishment Clause concern d1sttnct from that addre!'~ by the
effects doctrine. Even where state Bld to parochial institutions does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion, the prov1sion of such aid may nonetheless
violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the mteraction of church
and state in the administration of that aid.
/d. at 3237.
116. Id. at 3237-38.
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prong. 117 The Court declared that state involvement in the affairs of a
religious institution injures the religious freedom of nonadherents by
appearing to lend governmental support to the religion. 118 Conversely,
government interference compromises the religious freedom of adherents.'19 The Court found that the New York City program implicated
both concerns. 120 Justice Brennan then surveyed the history of parochial school aid decisions, although mention of Regan was conspicuously absent. 121 The Court cited language from Meek that focused on
the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of parochial schools. 122 Because
such an atmosphere might influence teachers and result in subtle or
blatant advancement of religion, the Court reasoned, state surveillance
is necessary to prevent that advancement of religion. Although the
Court conceded that the New York City plan arguably provided the
requisite monitoring to avoid the danger of improper effect, the Court
held that the surveillance impermissibly entangled the government
with the church schools. 123
Justice Powell authored a separate concurring opinion. Powell
117. !d. See generally supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
118. 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
119. /d.
120. /d. at 3238. The pervasively sectarian nature of many schools involved in
New York City's Title 1 program required that a permanent state presence be maintained in the schools, thereby implicating the first concern. /d. at 3238. But cf Lynch
v. Donnelly, 104 U.S. 1355 (1984) (Court approved exhibition of ctty owned creche in
Christmas display). The New York City Plan also implicated the second concern because it requued sectarian schools to endure a permanent state presence. 105 S.Ct. at
3239.
121. /d. at 3237-38; see supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
122. 105 S.Ct. at 3238; see supra note 74 and accompanying text; cf the Regan
Court's reading of Meek, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. Justice Brennan stated:
This pervasive monitonng by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes
precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibttton of excessive entanglement. Agents of the state must visit and inspect the rehgious school
regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matters in Title I
classes. . . . In addlllon, the religious schools must obey these state agents when
they make determinations as to what is and what is not a 'religious symbol' and
thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school ... must endure
the ongoing presence of state personnel. ...
/d. at 3238-39. Yet, had the city failed to provide this monitoring, the Court would
undoubtedly have found its program unconstitutional under the " primary effect" prong
of the Lemon test. Cf Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) (program whereby publicly employed teachers conducted classes in private schools was unconstitutional under the "primary effect" prong).
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agreed that the New York City plan involved excessive entanglement, 124 but went on to explore the question of whether the program
violated the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. To support his
affirmative answer to that question, Justice Powell argued that Title I
impermissibly subsidized private schools by relieving them of the duty
to offer remedial courses. 125 Powell characterized Title I aid as "direct,"126 thereby distinguishing those cases in which the Court upheld
aid to parochial schools. 127
Chief Justice Burger's stinging dissent accused the majority of a
paranoic reaction to a legitimate and beneficial program. 128 Relying on
his separate opinion in Meek v. Pittenger for support, 129 the Chief Justice argued that no demonstrable damage is done to the establishment
clause by Title I programs. 130 He asserted that the majority's invalidation of New York City's program, though purporting to be done in the
name of religious neutrality, actually evidenced hostility toward
religion. 131
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Aguilar for the reasons he articulated
in Wallace v. Jaffe, 132 in which he mounted an attack on the entire
framework of establishment clause jurisprudence. Rehnquist surveyed
the historical context of the adoption of the first amendment religion
clauses. 133 Rehnquist concluded that the separationist theory 134 un124. /d. at 3240 (Powell, J., concurring).
125. /d. at 3241. The Court, however, had coru.istently rejected Justice Powell's
argument in prior cases. See, e.g., Regan, 444 U.S. at 658; Roemer v. Maryland Pub.
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976); see also New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434
U.S. 125, 134 (1977). Further, the Title I statute itself belies Powell's subsidy concern
Title I programs should only supplement parochial school programs already m existence. See supra note 16.
126. lOS S.Ct at 3241 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. But cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Rehg1ous Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S
646 (1980) (upholdmg direct grant to parochial schools for testing and recordkeepmg
costs).
128. Ch1ef Justice Burger stated: "It borders on paranoia to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury or the BIShop of Rome lurkmg behmd programs . VJtal to the
nation's schoolchildren ..." lOS S.Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C. J .• dassenting).
129. /d. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 38S (Burger, C. J., concumng in part and dissenting
in part).
130. lOS S.Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
131. /d. at 3242-43.
132. lOS S.Ct. 2479, 2S08 (1985).
133. /d. at 2S08-15. See genual/y Anastaplo, supra note 17, at 183; N. DORSEN, P
BENDE R AND B. NEWBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS I'll THL UNITED STATES
1170 (4th ed. 1976) (hereinafter cited as N. DoRSEN]; Note, supra note 39; THL Llf[
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derlying the modern court's analysis had no historical basis; rather, the
framers intended only to prevent the establishment of a national religion and to forbid governmental preference among religions. m He argued that the Lemon test, based upon historical misconception, is
unworkable. 136 Citing the anomalous results and divided opinions resulting from use of the Lemon test, 137 Justice Rehnquist advocated
abandonment of the test in favor of an approach measuring legislation
against the historical basis of the establishment clause. 138
Justice O'Connor also filed a separate dissent, joined in part by Justice Rehnquist. O'Connor first noted the majority's failure to address
the issue of whether Title I programs have the effect of advancing religion. 139 O'Connor's evaluation of that issue yielded a negative answer. 140 Justice O'Connor then criticized the majority's holding on the
AND SF! FeTED WRITIISGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (A. Koch and W. Peden
eds 1944).
134. The separatlomst theory entered the modern court's Jurisprudence in Even.on
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 15 (1946}:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least thiS:
Nenher a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, rud all religions, or prefer one religJon over another.
Neither can force nor mfluence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profes!> a belief or disbelief in any religiOn. No
person can be pumshed for entertaining or professing rellg1ous beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any relig1ou~ activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state or the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious orgamzations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was mtended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and state."
!d.
135. 105 S Ct. at 2512 (Rehnqu1st, J., diSSenting). This htStoncal theory enjOys acceptance among a number of emment constitutional scholars. See, e.g., Anastaplo,
supra note 17; N. DoRSEr., supra note 133.
136. 105 S Ct at 2517-18 (Rehnquist, J., di~~ntmg).
137. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that few Supreme Court opinions in the area of
aid to paroch1al schools ever commanded a majonty of the Court; none has been unanimous. Id. at 2516.
138. Jd. at 2520. JuM1ce Rehnquist explained that "h1story abundantly shows ...
nothing in the Establishment Clause reqUires government to be stricti} neutral between
religion and irreligiOn, nor does that Clause prohibit Congres.'i or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory o;ectanan means." /d.
139. 105 S.Ct. at 3244 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
140. /d. at 3245-46. Justice O'Connor pursued a factual analySIS to reach the conclusion that the Title I program had no impcrm1~ible effect. The New York Cny pro-
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entanglement issue as inconsistent with the factual record, 141 and questioned the utility of the entanglement test in any circumstances. 142 Expressing concern that the Court had repeatedly invoked entanglement
as an independent ground to thwart legislative efforts that had both
secular purposes and effects, 143 Justice O'Connor argued that entanglement should be a consideration only as a factor in the Court's evaluation of the effect of legislation. 144
V.

ANALYSIS

Aguilar v. Felton demonstrates the tenuous position the Lemon test
occupies. The majority's invocation of the entanglement prong to invalidate New York City's Title I program seemed inevitable in light of
Meek, 145 yet scrutiny of the Court's analysis reveals several flaws that
ultimately topple the analytical structure.
First, the majority's emphasis on avoiding the appearance of endorsing a religion seems out of step with the Court's recent decision in
Lynch v. Donnelly. 146 The city-owned creche, upheld in Lynch, conveys a message of government endorsement of religion far stronger
than that flowing from the offer of remedial services on private school
premises. The creche is a symbol with readily apparent religious significance; in contrast, the remedial classes conducted by Title I teachers
have no religious significance. 147 Moreover, the New York City program had operated successfully for 14 years, without incident of improper advancement
of religion. Justice O'Connor stated that·
[l]he actual and perceived effect of the program is precisely the effect intended by
Congress: impoverished !tehool children are bemg helped to overcome learning
deficits, improving their test scores, and rece1ving a ignificant boost tn their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the opportunities that flow from it.
/d. at 3245.
141. Justice O'Connor emphasized that in the 19 years the New York City Title I
plan operated, not one inc1dent of teachers attempting to inculcate religion could be
cited. /d. at 3245.
142. /d. at 3247.
143. See generally Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 683 (1980) (arguing that enlargement
should not "represent a value to be judicially secured by the Establishment Clause.").
144. 105 S.Ct. at 3248.
145. See supra notes 69-80 and accompan:ring text.
146. 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984); see supra note 99.
147. As Justice O'Connor observed m her Aguilar dissent:
[A]n objective observer of the implementation of the Title I program m Nev. York
would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the participating paroch1al school\.
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gram explicitly prohibits any involvement of public personnel in the
religious functions of the participating schools. 148
Second, the majority argues that the religious schools suffer when
government intrudes into their day-to-day operation. 149 Yet it is hard
to see how Title I programs are any more intrusive than the accepted
involvement of governmental agencies in setting curricula, mandating
state testing and establishing minimum attendance requirements for
private schools. 150 Moreover, the sectarian schools stand to suffer
more if the Court forces the government to withdraw its sorely needed
aid.
Finally, the Lemon test has trapped the Court into a pattern of holdings based on factual distinctions that seem to have little legal significance. For example, the Aguilar majority distinguished the Title I
program, directing aid mainly to schools for younger children, from
constitutional programs aiding sectarian colleges. 151 The Court characterized these lower level schools as "pervasively sectarian," with a
broader concern for the inculcation of religious values than their college counterparts. 152 This conclusory characterization is inadequate to
explain why a Title I plan, specifically targeted for secular uses, should
fall while a general grant for any "non-sectarian purpose" to a sectarian collegem withstands constitutional scrutiny. The Meek distinction
between on-site and off-site instruction is similarly flawed. The notion
that a public schoolteacher will abdicate his professional obligations
when he crosses the parochial school threshold has no empirical support. 154 The danger that state or local government will inadvertently
To the contrary, the actual and perceived effect of the program is precisely the
effect intended by Congres.s: Impoverished school children are being helped to
overcome learning deficus, improving their test scores, and receiving a significant
boost in their struggle to obtain both a thorough education and the opportunities
that flow from it.
105 S.Ct. at 3245 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3235: "The professionals involved in the program are
directed to avoid involvement with religio us activities that are conducted withm the
private schools and to bar religious materials in theu classrooms."
149. Id. at 3239; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g. , Comm1ttee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980).
151. 105 S.Ct. at 3238.
152. /d.
153. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); see also supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
154. Cf Hargrove, Teachers· Perceptions of ESEA Title I Programs, 103 EDUCA·
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advance religion is no more present in a parochial school classroom,
that New York City demands be stripped of religious symbols, •~~ than
it is in a mobile classroom down the block. 1~ 6
The Lemon test, as illustrated in Aguilar, leads to factual linedrawing rather than clear judicial imperatives. Thus, the test both confuses
the lower courts and stymies legislatures. Legislatures must walk a
tightrope-they must draft programs with enough government controls to assure that religion is not advanced but not so many that entanglement results. 1 ~ 7 As Aguilar demonstrates, the Lemon test often
operates to defeat the legislative process.
The vehemence of the Aguilar dissents and the current political climate portend a decline in the importance of the Lemon test. An additional Reagan appointee to the Supreme Court probably would shift it
toward a less separationist interpretation of the establishment clause.
The test that replaces Lemon should be designed to produce uniformity
of result. In the meantime, lower courts and legislatures have only the
imprecise contours of the weakened Lemon test to guide them in drawing appropriate lines between church and state.
Laura L Gaston•

TlON 196, 196 ( 1982), assessing how teachers view operation of Title I programs: ''The

perceptual framework of a teacher in a particular school is shaped by past and present
classroom experiences, by students, parents, and immediate colleagues." See alw Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting): "Given that not a single incident of
religious indoctrination bas been identified as occurring in the thousands of classes offered in Grand Rapids and New York over the past two decades, it is time to acknowl·
edge that the risk identified in Meek was greatly exaggerated."
155. 105 S.Ct. at 3235.
156. The Court approved publicly financed instruction for parochial school students
conducted in mobile units in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see supra notes
81-86 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
• B.A., University of Arkansas, 1982; J .D., Washington University, 1986.

